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T HIS article is devoted to a brief survey of the extent to which
foreign corporations may be subjected to state income taxes,
with particular reference to the validity of the clause in the Wisconsin
statute which declares that a foreign corporation carrying on its prin-
cipal business in that state shall be taxed as if it were organized under
the laws of Wisconsin.' The discussion is based on specific provisions
of the Wisconsin statute. But the problems considered are of general
interest because they pertain to the underlying principles upon which
jurisdiction to levy income taxes depends.
The Wisconsin income tax law as originally adopted applied to non-
resident individuals and foreign corporations, in respect of all income
"derived from sources within the state or within its jurisdiction." 2
Section 71.02 (3) (e), Wis. Stats., 1931: "A foreign corporation whose principal
business is carried on or transacted in Wisconsin shall be deemed a resident
of this state for income tax purposes, and its income shall be determined and
assessed as if it were incorporated under the laws of Wisconsin notwithstand-
ing its domicile is elsewhere."
2 Section 1087m-2, subd. 3, Wis. Stats., 1911: "The tax shall be assessed, levied
and collected upon all income, not hereinafter exempted, received by every
person residing within the state, and by every nonresident of the state upon
such income as is derived from sources within the state or within its jurisdic-
tion. So much of the income of any person residing within the state as is de-
rived from rentals, stocks, bonds, securities or evidences of indebtedness shall
be assessed and taxed, whether such income is derived from sources within or
without the state; provided that any person engaged in business within and
without the state shall, with respect to income other than that derived from
rentals, stocks, bonds, securities or evidences of indebtedness, be taxed only
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The generality of these terms implies a justifiable feeling of uncertainty
on the part of the framers of the law as to the precise location of the
line of constitutional power to which they were attempting to hew. The
language also evidences a determination to go to the full limit of the
state's authority over incomes of non-residents and foreign corpora-
tions, and to spare no such income which by any legal theory could be
subjected to tax.
By later amendments the subject-matter included within the general
phrase "derived from sources within the state or within its jurisdic-
tion" became defined in concrete form.3 The rules contained in the
statute now in force define with precision the incidence of the income
tax on foreign corporations whose principal business is not carried on
in Wisconsin, and provide in effect that such persons shall be taxed
only upon income:
Derived from the use or sale of realty or tangible personalty located
in Wisconsin; or, derived from mercantile or manufacturing business
carried on (1) exclusively in Wisconsin, or (2) in Wisconsin and
elsewhere, being subject to apportionment in the latter case in the man-
ner hereafter explained.
Corporations organized under the laws of Wisconsin are taxed not
only on income falling within the classes mentioned above but also on
income:
Derived from patent royalties, interest, dividends, or gains on the
sale of intangible personal property; this class of income being com-
monly known as "income from investments."4
In other words the distinction between domestic corporations and
foreign corporations, as regards liability for Wisconsin income tax, is
that Wisconsin corporations are taxable on income from investments
as above defined, while such income is exempt from tax if received by
a foreign corporation having its principal business outside Wisconsin.
The latter distinction, however, does not apply in the case of a foreign
corporation transacting its principal business in Wisconsin, such a tax-
upon that proportion of such income as is derived from business transacted
and property located within state, which shall be determined in the manner
specified in subdivision (e) of section 1770b, as far as applicable."
3 Section 71.02 (3) (c), Wis. Stats., 1931: "For the purposes of taxation income
from mercantile or manufacturing business, not requiring apportionment under
paragraph 71.02 (3) (d) shall follow the situs of the business from which de-
rived. Income derived from rentals and royalties from real estate or tangible
personal property, or from the operation of any farm, mine or quarry, or from
the sale of real property or tangible personal property shall follow the situs
of the property from which derived. All other income, including royalties from
patents, income derived from personal services, professions and vocations and
from land contracts, mortgages, stocks, bonds and securities or from the sale
of similar intangible personal property, shall follow the residence of the re-
cipient . . .
4The statute provides that such income follows the residence of the recipient.
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payer being taxed in all respects as if it were a Wisconsin corporation,
by virtue of sec. 71.02 (3) (e). 5 The effect 'of the latter provisions may
be illustrated by a simple example:
Corporation "A", organized in Delaware, operates manufacturing
plants in Wisconsin and Illinois. The company derives income from
patent royalties paid by a licensee in Germany, interest from mort-
gages on Iowa farms, interest from bank accounts carried in
Chicago banks, interest from Canadian Government bonds, divi-
dends on Chicago bank stock, profits from the sale of securities on the
New York stock exchange. None of such income pertains to the recipi-
ent's manufacturing business. The principal business of the company is
located in Chicago. None of the income above specified would be tax-
able in Wisconsin.
Corporation "B" receives like income, and its situation is similar to
that of "A" in all respects, except that the principal business of Corpo-
ration "B" happens to be located in Wisconsin. All of the income re-
ferred to would be taxable in Wisconsin under the terms of sec. 71.02
(3) (e).
Has Wisconsin power to thus tax a foreign corporation upon in-
come derived from intangible investment securities as mentioned in
the foregoing example? If so, what is the basis of jurisdiction over this
class of subjects? Does the exercise of power attempted under the
enactment last cited violate any guarantees in the Federal Constitution?
What are the limits of state jurisdiction to tax incomes of foreign cor-
porations and upon what principles are such limitations established? To
deal with these questions it is necessary to examine the premises of
state jurisdiction to levy income taxes.
Jurisdiction to impose taxes depends upon the presence of the sub-
ject of the tax within the territorial limits of the taxing power. Persons
and property are subjects of taxation.6 Taxes on real estate are based
5 Quoted in Note 1, supra.
6 In City of St. Louis v. The Wiggins Ferry Co., 11 Wall. 423, 20 L.Ed. 192
(1871), on the question of state power to tax, the court said: "The authority
extends over all persons and property within the sphere of its territorial juris-
diction. * * * Where there is jurisdiction neither as to'person nor property, the
imposition of a tax would be ultra vires and void. If the legislature of a state
should enact that the citizens or property of another state or country should be
taxed in the same manner as the persons and property within its own limits
and subject to its authority, or in any other manner whatsoever, such a law
would be as much a nullity as if in conflict with the most explicit constitutional
inhibition. Jurisdiction is as necessary to valid legislation as to valid judicial
action."
Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct.
36, 50 L.Ed. 150 (1905). In this case the court used the following language: "It
is also essential to the validity of a tax that the property shall be within the
territorial jurisdiction of the taxing power. Not only is the operation of state
laws limited to persons and property within the boundaries of the state, but
property which is wholly and exclusively, within the jurisdiction of another
state receives none of the protection for which the tax is supposed to be the
compensation."
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on jurisdiction over property. A capitation tax is based on jurisdiction
over persons. An inheritance tax on the transfer of real estate is based
on jurisdiction over property,7 while an inheritance tax on the transfer
of intangible securities, excluding the question of "business situs," de-
pends upon personal jurisdiction.8
Business is sometimes spoken of as constituting an independent
subject of taxation.9 But this is an inaccurate and confusing use of
terms, and it is preferable to consider a tax laid upon business as such,
as relating essentially to the services of persons or to the employment
of capital, or to a combination of these factors, and therefore depend-
ent on power over the persons and/or property generating the business
activity referred to in the taxing law.
To what extent does the right of a state to tax the income of a
foreign corporation depend on jurisdiction over the person of the tax-
payer? As to individuals domiciled within the state, the fact of domi-
cile unquestionably confers jurisdiction to impose a tax upon income
derived by such persons from sources outside as well as within the
taxing state. Thus in Lawrence v. State Tax Commission of Mississip-
pi,10 a citizen of Mississippi challenged the power of that state to tax
him upon income derived from his business of building roads in Ten-
nessee. In upholding the validity of the statute under which the assess-
ment was made the supreme court said:
"The obligation of one domiciled within a State to pay taxes there,
arises from the unilateral action of the State Government in the exer-
cise of the most plenary of sovereign powers, that to raise revenue to
defray the expenses of government and to distribute its burdens equa-
bly among those who enjoy its benefits. Hence, domicile in itself estab-
lishes a basis for taxation. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence
within the State, and the attendant right to invoke the protection of
its laws are inseparable from the responsibility for sharing the costs of
government. * * *
"It is enough, so far as the constitutional power of the State to levy
it is concerned, that the tax is imposed by Mississippi on its own citi-
zens with reference to the receipt and enjoyment of income derived
from the conduct of business, regardless of the place where it is car-
7 There is an interesting discussion on this point in Stimson, "Jurisdiction and
Power of Taxation," (1933) pp. 73 et seq.
8 Farmers Loan & Trust Company v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98,
74 L.Ed. 371 (1930).
9 In The Cleveland, Painesville & Ashtabula R. R. Co. v. Connnonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300, 21 L.Ed. 179 (1873), where a state tax was levied
on foreign held bonds, the court said: "The power of taxation, however vast
in its character and searching in its extent, is necessarily limited to subjects
within the jurisdiction of the state. These subjects are persons, property and
business. Whatever form taxation may assume, whether as duties, imposts,
excises or licenses, it must relate to one of these subjects."10 286 U.S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556, 76 L.Ed. 1102 (1932).
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ried on. The tax, which is apportioned to the ability of the taxpayer to
bear it, is founded upon the protection afforded to the recipient of the
income by the State, in his person, in his right to receive the income,
and in his enjoyment of it when received."
A similar exercise of jurisdiction was involved in a Wisconsin case
in which the court sustained an assessment of income tax upon royal-
ties received by a Wisconsin corporation from the operation of iron
mines located in Michigan.11 The validity of such taxing power over
domestic corporations has been expressly recognized by the United
States Supreme Court in upholding a franchise tax under a North Da-
kota statute computed upon the entire value of the stock of a domestic
corporation which had no business or tangible property whatever with-
in the taxing state.1 2 In the last cited case the court said:
"The company was confessedly domiciled in North Dakota for it
was incorporated under the laws of that state. * * * The fact that its
property and business were entirely in another state did not make it
any the less subject to taxation in the state of its domicile."
By virtue of sovereignty over the person of its citizens the United
States government taxes the income of domestic corporations derived
from foreign sources. 13 The decisions holding the whole income of
residents, regardless of the sources whence derived, to be a taxable
subject within the domiciliary state's power, may be explained by con-
sidering the tax as an excise on the receipt of income or on the priv-
ilege of receiving it, and by treating all such income as received in the
state of domicile or the privilege exercised therein with respect to all
income received. 14
Jurisdiction which is based on the domicile of the taxpayer obvi-
ously cannot support an income tax imposed upon foreign corporations
nor upon individuals domiciled outside the taxing state. Even the fed-
eral government does not claim the power to tax non-resident aliens
or foreign corporations upon income earned abroad. As to such per-
sons only income derived from sources within the United States is sub-
jected to tax,'5 the reason for the restriction being that the tax is prop-
er only to the extent of income "earned under the protection of Amer-
"Pfister Land Co. v. Milwaukee, 166 Wis. 223, 165 N.W. 23 (1917).
22 Cream of, Wheat Company v. Grand Forks County, 253 U.S. 325, 40 Sup. Ct.
558, 64 L.Ed. 931 (1920).
'3 William E. Peck & Co., Inc. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165, 38 Sup. Ct. 432, 62 L. Ed.
1049 (1917); National Paper & Type Company v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373, 45
Sup. Ct. 133, 69 L.Ed. 331 (1924) ; Barclay & Co. v. Edwards, 267 U.S. 442, 45
Sup. Ct. 348, 69 L.Ed. 703 (1925).
14 See Henry Rottschaefer, "State of Jurisdiction of Income for Tax Purposes,"
44 Har. Law Rev. 1075 (1931). -
'5 Revenue Act of 1932, sec. 211; sec. 231.
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ican laws."'" The principle that taxation is justified only by an equiva-
lent rendered to the taxpayer by the government has been expressed by
the United States Supreme Court in the following language :17
"The power of taxation, indispensable to the existence of every
civilized government, is exercised upon the assumption of an equiva-
lent rendered to the taxpayer in the protection of his person and prop-
erty, in adding to the value of such property, or in the creation and
maintenance of public conveniences in which he shares,-such, for in-
stance, as roads, bridges, sidewalks, pavements, and schools for the
education of his children. If the taxing power be in no position to ren-
der these services, or otherwise to benefit the person or property taxed,
and such property be wholly within the taxing power of another state,
to which it may be said to owe an allegiance, and to which it looks for
protection, the taxation of such property within the domicile of the
owner partakes rather of the nature of an extortion than a tax, and
has been repeatedly held by this court to be beyond the power of the
legislature, and a taking of property without due process of law."
If income taxes be thus regarded as the price of governmental pro-
tection and services rendered to the property and person of the tax-
payer, there is a logical basis for a difference of treatment as between
residents and non-residents, for the law of the state of domicile con-
fers upon its individual and corporate citizens a considerable number
and variety of rights and privileges which are not conferred by any
other law."" In return for these special rights and privileges the domi-
ciliary state may tax the whole income of its citizens. But the non-
resident of a state receives from its laws a lesser measure of rights,
protection and privileges, and it is but just and appropriate that his
burden of income tax should be reduced accordingly. Likewise in the
case of foreign corporations.
Upon the basis of this reasoning has developed the principle that
the power of a state to levy income taxes upon non-resident individuals
and foreign corporations extends only to income derived from sources
within the taxing state. The United States Supreme Court has adopted
the conclusion that any income tax which violates the principle referred
to is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The power of taxation is based upon the assumption of an equiv-
alent rendered to the taxpayer. In the case of a foreign corporation the
taxing state renders no such equivalent save as regards income earned
under the protection of its laws, and to impose a tax on other income
takes the taxpayer's property without due process of law, i. e., without
6 National Paper & Type Co. v. Bowers, 266 U.S. 373, 45 Sup. Ct. 133, 69 L.Ed.
331 (1924).
I Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 26 Sup. Ct. 36, 50
L.Ed. 150 (1905).
18 For the purposes of this discussion every corporation is regarded as domiciled
in the state of its origin and as a nonresident elsewhere.
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rendering any equivalent for the burden. This conclusion, while im-
plied in earlier decisions, was first declared in positive terms in Hans
Rees Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina.19 In that case the taxpayer, a New
York corporation which operated a leather tannery in North Carolina.
challenged the validity of an income tax assessment based on an ap-
portionment formula under the North Carolina statute, on the ground
that the effect of the law was to tax a greater proportion of the tax-
payer's income than was actually derived from sources within that
state. This contention was sustained by the court and the assessment
was declared beyond the authority of the taxing state and therefore
void under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When a state lays an income tax upon a foreign corporation by
reason of business transacted or property located within the taxing
state, is such legislative act based on jurisdiction over the taxpayer's
person or on jurisdiction over property? This is a controverted ques-
tion. It has been stated by eminent authority that only the state of
domicile has jurisdiction to impose a personal tax.2 0 If so, then the in-
come tax on a foreign corporation is not a personal tax. This view is
supported by the following language of the Supreme Court used in up-
holding an Oklahoma tax on income of a non-resident derived from the
production and sale of oil in that state:
" * * * the very fact that a citizen of one state has the right to hold
property or carry on an occupation or business in another is a very
reasonable ground for subjecting such non-resident, although not per-
sonally, yet to the extent of his property held, or his occupation or busi-
ness carried on therein, to a duty to pay taxes not more onerous in
effect than those imposed under like circumstances upon citizens of the
latter state. * * *
"The entire jurisdiction of the state over appellant's property and
business and the income that he derived from them-the only jurisdic-
tion that it has sought to assert-is a jurisdiction in rem; and we are
clear that the state acted within its lawful power in treating his prop-
erty interests and business as having both unity and continuity."
211
Similar language was used by the circuit court of appeals in decid-
ing the Shaffer case.22
19 283 U.S. 123, 51 Sup. Ct. 385, 75 L.Ed. 879 (1930). See also the annotation to
this case in 75 L. Ed. 879 dealing with many of the questions discussed above.
20 Joseph H. Beale, "Jurisdiction To Tax": 32 Har. Law Rev. 587, 589 et seq.
(1919).
2 Slzaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221, 64 L.Ed. 445 (1920).2 2 Shaffer v. Howard, 250 Fed. 873 (E. D. Okla., 1918). In upholding the assess-
ment the court said: "Unless the state has given protection or benefit to this
income, it has no reason or right to ask contribution therefrom. * * * It does
not necessarily follow from this definition that the plaintiff is subject to in-
come tax only in the state of his residence. It means, rather, that he is subject
to income taxation only in those jurisdictions which protect him in the produc-
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To describe as "jurisdiction in rem," the power exercised by a state
in levying income taxes on non-residents by reason of business activ-
ties within the taxing state, does not clarify the discussion.2 The sug-
gested definition is inconsistent with the commonly accepted idea that
income taxes are not levied upon, or in respect of, property, but in
every case upon the person of the recipient of the income. As stated by
the supreme court of Wisconsin:
"It is the recipient of the income that is taxed-not his property-
and the vital question in each case is, has the person sought to be
taxed received an income during the tax year? * * * If the person
sought to be taxed is the recipient during the tax year of such specific
property as income in its ordinary significance, then the person is
taxed. But the tax is upon the right or ability to produce, create, re-
ceive, and enjoy, and not upon specific property. Hence, the amount
of the tax is measured by the amount of the income irrespective of the
amount of specific property or ability necessary to produce or create
it.",24
The income tax, according to the Wisconsin court, "is laid upon
the individual in proportion to his ability to pay, such ability being
measured by his income. ' 25 It is "not levied upon property, funds, or
profits, but upon the right of an individual or corporation to receive in-
tion, creation, receipt, and enjoyment of his income. If he lives in Illinois, and
has in Oklahoma the property or the business from which his income flows,
does not the latter state truly protect him in the privilege of producing, creat-
ing, receiving, and enjoying that income when it permits and protects his busi-
ness from which the income flows? * * * Both the property in Oklahoma and
the intelligence in Illinois contributed to this income. Each was necessary to
the result. Each had protection from the state in which it was. It is impossible
to separate the two elements for taxation purposes. It is impossible, if ma-
terial, to determine which was most potent in the result. Can either state be
told it cannot be compensated for its protection of a necessary component ele-
ment of this income, or that it cannot measure such compensation by that in-
come? * * * It may be true that the state which protects the person of the
one who creates, receives or enjoys an income may require of him therefor a
tax measured by his ability to pay from his entire income. That is no reason
why the state which protects the business which contributes to his income may
not also demand demand as pay for that protection a tax measured by that
part of his income which came from that business. * * *
"A tax upon an income of the instant character is directed at neither the per-
son who receives nor the property from which the income arises, but at the
privilege of making, producing, creating, receiving, and enjoying the income
itself. The right to lay such tax depends upon the protection of the person who
receives or of the business which helps create that income."
23 The power of government to enforce payment of personal income taxes out
of property of the taxpayer within the jurisdiction might warrant the use of
the phrase "jurisdiction in rem" in those cases where such property is actually
present, but the expression cannot aptly be applied to the jurisdiction to lay
income taxes on persons who transact business and earn income in a state but
own no property therein.
24 State ex rel. Sallie F. Moon Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 166 Wis. 287,
163 N.W. 639 (1917).
25 State ex rel. Stern Milling Campany v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 170 Wis.
506, 175 N.W. 931 (1920).
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come or profits. '26 "In the ordinary acceptation of the term, this may
be said to be tax upon income as the statute denominates it." '27 If it be
necessary to classify the income tax within one of the recognized classi-
fications of taxes, it is probably an excise tax. However, in popular
understanding, it is a personal tax, measured by one's ability to pay.
This is also the economic view. It is an annual tax.128
It may be that the court resorted to the expression "jurisdiction in
rein" in Shaffer v. Carter2 9 in order to avoid classifying the tax as a
personal tax, in deference to the assumption that a personal tax may not
be levied outside the state of the taxpayer's domicile. This question of
terminology and classification may be disposed of for practical pur-
poses by regarding the personal presence of the foreign corporation in
the taxing state as a sufficient warrant for the latter's authority to im-
pose an income tax, such authority being limited, however, to income
from property located or business carried on in that state.
In assessing the income of a foreign corporation engaged in manu-
facturing or mercantile business both within and without the bound-
aries of a given state, the latter is permitted to apportion the total net
income derived by the taxpayer from such business on the basis of any
formula which operates to allocate to the taxing state no more than its
fair share of the income.30 The Wisconsin statute employs a rather
complex ratio based upon three factors involving the amount of the
taxpayer's sales, the value of its tangible property and the total costs
of its manufacturing operations.31
Allocation formulae are permissible, however, only to the extent
that the taxpayer's business carried on within the taxing state is in fact
"unitary" with operations carried on outside that state; and lines of
productive activity outside the taxing jurisdiction which are distinct
from activities within that state must be excluded from apportionment
calculations. Thus the Standard Oil Company of Indiana which was
26 Paine v. City of Oshkosh, 190 Wis. 69, 208 N.W. 790 (1926).
27 State ex rel. Sallie F. Moon Cormpany v. Wisconsin Tax Commission. supra.
28 Fitch v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, 201 Wis. 283, 230 N.W. 37 (1930).
29 Cited in Note 21, supra.
30 In Underwood Typewriter Company v. Chantberlain, 254 U.S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct.
45, 65 L.Ed. 165 (1920), the court sustained a Connecticut income tax on aforeign corporation whose manufacturing operations were wholly within the
state and whose selling operations were outside the state, computed on the
ratio between the value of the taxpayer's tangible property within Connecticut
and the total value of the company's tangible property everywhere. It was held
that such method of apportionment was reasonably appropriate, there being no
evidence to the contrary. While the tax here involved was a franchise tax
measured by net income, the court treated it as if it were a tax directly on in-
come and said the distinction was not material.
31 Section 71.02 (3) (d), Wis. Stats., 1931. A careful analysis of the operation of
the Wisconsin apportionment formula is contained in an article by Frederic
Sammond. "Three Common Constitutional Misconceptions of Income Tax
Law," 8 Wis. Law Rev. 199 (1933).
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engaged in North Dakota in selling petroleum products which were ex-
tracted and refined outside that state was held entitled to exclude all
operations pertaining to its extraction and refining business from the
calculation of income on which it was taxable in North Dakota.8 2 A
similar result was reached in Wisconsin. In other words, income from
foreign sources which is capable of segregation must be segregated and
excluded from apportionment formulae. 33
It has long been settled that a state is not restricted by the com-
merce clause in the federal constitution in applying its income tax to
persons carrying on business subject to its laws, by reason of the fact
that the incomes of such persons may be derived in part from inter-
state commerce. Such a tax, correctly apportioned as explained above,
does not constitute an undue burden on interstate commerce.8 4
The holding of the supreme court in the Hans Rees Sons, Inc.
case 15 to the effect that the only income on which a foreign corporation
may be taxed by any state is income earned within that state, is based
on the Supreme Court's conviction that multiple taxation is unfair. By
multiple taxation is meant the imposition of a tax upon the identical
subject-matter by more than one state. Thus multiple taxation results
if the owner of an automobile is required to pay a property tax thereon
in the state of his residence and also in another state where the car
is habitually kept. Undesirable results which are inevitably produced
by such multiple taxation led the supreme court to adopt the rule that
multiple taxation is contrary to the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
The principle referred to was first developed in relation to property
taxes in Union Refrigerator Transit Company v. Kentucky.3 6 In that
case the question was whether or not the state of Kentucky had power
to impose a tax on refrigerator cars owned by a domestic corporation
but located permanently outside the state of Kentucky. The assessment
was held illegal upon the ground that the state had no jurisdiction to
tax personal property permanently located outside its borders. A simi-
32 Standard Oil Company v. Thoresen, 29 F. (2d) 708 (C.C.A. 8th. 1929).
33 Standard Oil Company v. Tax Commission, 197 Wis. 630, 223 N.W. 85 (1929).
34 United States Glue Company v. Town of -Oak Creek, 247 U.S. 321, 38 Sup. Ct.
499, 62 L.Ed. 1135 (1918). But a foreign corporation whose intrastate activi-
ties consist merely in the solicitation of orders for merchandise subject to ac-
ceptance at the corporation's office in another state and filled by shipments in
interstate commerce cannot be subjected to a local franchise tax. Alpha Port-
land Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 45 Sup. Ct. 477, 69 L.Ed. 916(1925). A state may not impose a franchise tax on a foreign corporation whose
intrastate activities consist in selling merchandise contained in original pack-
ages imported from abroad. Anglo Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288
U.S. 218, 53 Sup. Ct. 373, 77 L.Ed. 710 (1933). See also the treatment of the
subject of interstate commerce in Frederic Sammond's article, cited in Note
31, supra.
a Cited in Note 19, supra.
36 Cited in Note 17, supra.
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lar result was reached recently in Johnson Oil Refining Company v.
State of Oklahoma.3 7 The latter case involved the validity of an assess-
ment of property taxes on a fleet of railroad tank cars owned by a for-
eign corporation and used to transport oil from a refinery in Oklahoma
to delivery points in other states. The state undertook to tax the entire
value of the fleet notwithstanding the fact that each car was physically
outside Oklahoma the greater part of the tax year. In holding that the
tax exceeded the constitutional power of the state, the court said that
"the jurisdiction of Oklahoma to tax property of this description must
be determined on a basis which is consistent with the like jurisdiction
of other states" and concluded that the amount of the taxpayer's prop-
erty habitually employed in the taxing state might be fairly determined
by taking the average number of cars physically present therein.
The idea that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits multiple taxa-
tion has been recently extended to limit the power of the states with
respect to inheritance taxes. In Frick v. Pennsylvania38 the question was
whether or not the transfer of tangible personal property located in
New York and Massachusetts owned by a decedent whose domicile
was in Pennsylvania could be subjected to the Pennsylvania inheritance
tax. The court answered this question in the negative.3 9
In a line of cases beginning with Farmers Loan & Trust Company
v. Minnesota" the supreme court has taken the position that the Four-
3 54 Sup. Ct. 152, 78 L.Ed. 130 (1933).
38268 U.S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L.Ed. 1058 (1925).
39 In discussing the question of jurisdiction the court said: "This precise ques-
tion has not been presented to this court before, but there are many decisions
dealing with cognate questions which point the way to its solution. These
decisions show, first, that the exaction by a state of a tax which it is without
power to impose is a taking of property without due process of law in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment; secondly, that while a state may so shape
its tax laws as to reach every object which is under its jurisdiction it cannot
give them any extraterritorial operation; and, thirdly, that as respects tangible
personal property having an actual situs in a particular state, the power to sub-ject it to state taxation rests exclusively in that state, regardless of the domi-
cile of the owner."
40 280 U.S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98 (1930). This decision was followed by Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L.Ed. 1056 (1930) ; Beidler v. South
Carolina Tax Commission, 282 U.S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54, 75 L.Ed. 131 (1930) ;
First National Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76
L.Ed. 313 (1932). In this case was involved the validity of an inheritance tax
assessed by the state of Maine upon the transfer of stock in a Maine corpora-
tion owned by a decedent who was domiciled in Massachusetts at the time of
his death. The assessment was held invalid upon the ground that Maine had
no jurisdiction in the premises. Summing up the effect of the decisions last
cited the court said: "The rule of immunity from taxation by more than one
state, deducible from the decisions in respect of these various and distinct
kinds of property, is broader than the applications thus far made of it. In its
application to death taxes, the rule rests for its justification upon the funda-
mental conception that the transmission from the dead to the living of a
particular thing, whether corporeal or incorporeal, is an event which cannot
take place in ,two or more states at one and the same time. In respect of tangi-
ble property, the opposite view must be rejected as connoting a physical im-
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teenth Amendment prohibits multiple inheritance taxes upon the trans-
fer of intangible personal property, and that the state of the owner's
domicile at the time of death is the only state wherein such property
has a situs for the purpose of death transfer taxes.41 While this conclu-
sion was arrived at over the vigorous and repeated dissent of several
members of the court, and while the reasoning of the majority may
not be invulnerable, there is scarcely any question that the practical
result of the rule as announced is desirable and beneficial. 42
It remains to test the validity of the Wisconsin enactment 43 which
taxes the investment income of foreign corporations having their prin-
cipal business in Wisconsin, in the light of the principles of jurisdiction
referred to in the foregoing discussion.4 4 The power of the domiciliary
state to tax its own residents as well as all corporations organized
under its laws upon the whole net income of such taxpayers from what-
ever sources derived, can hardly be questioned. It is true that double
taxation would result in case a Delaware corporation should be taxed
by the latter state upon all of its income including that derived from
sources in other states, provided the latter states also should tax their
proportionate share of such income determined by proper rules of ap-
portionment. It might be logical and desirable to place a limit upon the
power of the domiciliary state as regards taxes upon income earned
from business carried on in other states, in accordance with the restric-
tion imposed upon non-domiciliary states in that respect; and conceiv-
ably the supreme court may hereafter develop such a restriction, but
for the purpose of the present discussion it is enough to say that no
such limitation now exists. It may therefore be stated without reserva-
tion that the state wherein a corporation is organized may tax it upon
its whole income including interest, dividends, royalties and profits
possibility; in the case of intangible property, it must be rejected as involving
an inherent and logical self contradiction. Due regard for the processes of cor-
rect thinking compels the conclusion that a determination fixing the local situs
of a thing for the purpose of transferring it in one state carries with it an
implicit denial that there is a local situs in another state for the purpose of
transferring the same thing there. The contrary conclusion as to intangible
property has led to nothing but confusion and injustice by bringing about the
anomalous and grossly unfair result that one kind of personal property can-
not, for the purpose of imposing a transfer tax, be within the jurisdiction of
more than one state at the same time, while another kind, quite as much with-
in the protecting reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, may be, at the same
moment, within the taxable jurisdiction of as many as four states, and by
each subjected to a tax upon its transfer by death, an event which takes place,
and in the nature of things can take place, in one of the states only."
41 The court reserved the right to apply a different rule in the case of property
having a "business situs" outside the state of the owner's domicile.42 See, Charles F. B. Lowndes, "The Passing of Situs-Jurisdiction to Tax
Shares of Corporate Stock," 45 Har. Law Rev. 777 (1932).
43 Section 71.02 (3) (e), Wis. Stats., 1931.
44 See, Thomas G. Frost, "The Power of the States to Domesticate Foreign
Corporations for Income Tax Purposes," American Law Review, January-
February, 1925.
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from the sale of intangible capital assets, as well as income derived
from manufacturing or commercial activities. This is true regardless
of the location of the principal business of such taxpayer.
It follows from this that a Delaware corporation engaged in manu-
facturing in Wisconsin and carrying on in that state its "principal busi-
ness"4 5 would be taxable upon its income from intangible personalty
in the state of its domicile as well as in the state of Wisconsin. It fol-
lows further that if Wisconsin could tax such income, so could any
other state wherein the corporation happened to be carrying on any
local manufacturing business, for the location of the taxpayer's "prin-
cipal business" is a fact without significance so far as jurisdiction to
levy income taxes is concerned, and a state, wherein a foreign corpora-
tion carried on any local business whatever, would have, as regards the
taxation of income from investments, the same measure of constitu-
tional power as the state containing the location of the taxpayer's
"principal business."
The statutory provision in question therefore would permit multi-
ple taxation, and to uphold its validity would be wholly inconsistent
with the thought of the supreme court expressed in its most recent
declarations on that subject.48 The clause represents a frank attempt
to tax non-residents upon income earned beyond the protection of the
laws of the taxing sovereignty and respecting which the latter renders
no equivalent to the taxpayer. In the ordinary case a foreign corpora-
tion's income from investments would be entirely dissociated from
its local manufacturing or commercial activities, as in the example sug-
gested on page 69 ante, and would have no taxable situs except at
the domicile of the recipient. Consequently a tax on such receipts would
not be compensated by any equivalent rendered to the taxpayer by the
state of Wisconsin and would fall squarely within the condemnation of
the rule applied in Hans Rees Sons, Inc. v. North Carolina,7 requiring
such a compensatory equivalent.
45 The meaning of this vague term presents an interesting field of inquiry which
has not been touched upon in this discussion. It may be that the authors of the
law intended to imitate the provisions of the English statute under which cor-
porations and individuals are subject to income tax at their place of residence
and a corporation is deemed to reside at the place where it is managed. Stim-
son, op. cit., p. 88.46 Could the provision be sustained as a condition attached by the laws of Wis-
consin to the right of a foreign corporation to enter the state to carry on local
business? This question must be answered in the negative because a state has
no power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to do local business
upon the corporation's consent to an illegal exaction in the form of a tax con-
travening constitutional guarantees. People ex rel. Alpha Portland Cement Co.
v Knapp, 230 N.Y. 48, 129 N.E. 202 (1920); State of Washington v. Superior
Court, 289 U.S. 361, 53 Sup. Ct. 624, 77 L.Ed. 1256 (1933).
47 Cited in Note 19, supra.
